Give and Take in Dictator Games
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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Give and Take in Dictator Games. / Cappelen, Alexander W.; Nielsen, Ulrik Haagen; Sørensen, Erik Ø.; Tungodden, Bertil; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl.
I: Economics Letters, Bind 118, Nr. 2, 02.2013, s. 280–283.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Give and Take in Dictator Games
AU - Cappelen, Alexander W.
AU - Nielsen, Ulrik Haagen
AU - Sørensen, Erik Ø.
AU - Tungodden, Bertil
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl
N1 - JEL classification: C91; D63
PY - 2013/2
Y1 - 2013/2
N2 - It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogenous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.
AB - It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogenous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - Dictator game
KW - Choice set
KW - Social preferences
KW - Experiments
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.030
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.030
M3 - Journal article
VL - 118
SP - 280
EP - 283
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 42018030