Intergroup Bias in Parliamentary Rule Enforcement
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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Intergroup Bias in Parliamentary Rule Enforcement. / Hjorth, Frederik Georg.
I: Political Research Quarterly, Bind 69, Nr. 4, 2016, s. 692-702.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Intergroup Bias in Parliamentary Rule Enforcement
AU - Hjorth, Frederik Georg
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - Political actors are often assigned roles requiring them to enforce rules without giving in-groups special treatment. But are such institutional roles likely to be successful? Here, I exploit a special case of exogenously assigned intergroup relations: debates in the Danish Parliament, in which Parliament chairmen drawn from parliamentary parties enforce speaking time. Analyzing 5,756 speeches scraped from online transcripts, I provide evidence that speech lengths are biased in favor of the presiding chairman’s party. On average, speakers of the same party as the presiding chairman give 5 percent longer speeches and are 5 percent more likely to exceed the speaking time limit. The paper contributes to the extant literature by demonstrating political intergroup bias in a natural setting, suggesting that group loyalties can supersede institutional obligations even in a “least likely” context of clear rules, complete observability, and a tradition of parliamentary cooperation.
AB - Political actors are often assigned roles requiring them to enforce rules without giving in-groups special treatment. But are such institutional roles likely to be successful? Here, I exploit a special case of exogenously assigned intergroup relations: debates in the Danish Parliament, in which Parliament chairmen drawn from parliamentary parties enforce speaking time. Analyzing 5,756 speeches scraped from online transcripts, I provide evidence that speech lengths are biased in favor of the presiding chairman’s party. On average, speakers of the same party as the presiding chairman give 5 percent longer speeches and are 5 percent more likely to exceed the speaking time limit. The paper contributes to the extant literature by demonstrating political intergroup bias in a natural setting, suggesting that group loyalties can supersede institutional obligations even in a “least likely” context of clear rules, complete observability, and a tradition of parliamentary cooperation.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - legislatures
KW - social identity theory
KW - group identity
KW - natural experiments
KW - scraping
U2 - 10.1177/1065912916658553
DO - 10.1177/1065912916658553
M3 - Journal article
VL - 69
SP - 692
EP - 702
JO - Political Research Quarterly
JF - Political Research Quarterly
SN - 1065-9129
IS - 4
ER -
ID: 173706144